The paper questions the standard economic assumptions that competing economic agents have identical reservation utility levels, and that when differences in opportunity costs exist, they can be conveniently represented by fixed costs. Asymmetries in opportunity costs are considered in relation to current efficiency. The effect of this interchangeability of skills is studied in the context of the effect of entry on firm selection in a Cournot setting. It is found that inefficient firms are more likely to crowd out efficient ones when the relationship between current efficiency and opportunity costs is strong, and when the fixed costs of changing markets are high. Moreover, in the long-run, firms with intermediate cost levels are likely to induce the exit of low and high cost firms. The model sheds light on the benefits of diversification by multiproduct and multinational firms, and their relationship to skill transferability.
Introduction
It is a common assumption in the economic literature that when many agents are involved in a given activity, they have the same level of reservation utility, and this level of utility is generally normalized to zero. For instance, in bargaining games, an agent would never accept an exchange yielding a negative utility. In competition between firms, each firm must realize nonnegative profits and, under free entry, the zero-profit condition determines the number of firms in the industry. All agents are assumed to have similar reservation utilities, irrespective of their relative efficiencies.
This assumption does not account for the fact that skills may be interchangeable between activities. For instance, an agent who is very efficient in activity A may also be very efficient in activity B. This would generate a situation where efficiency is positively correlated with reservation utility. In industrial organization, the modeling of asymmetric reservation profits is most important when skills are easily interchangeable between industries, so that efficiency and high profits in one sector guarantee high profits in adjacent, but different, sectors. This is the case, for instance, for diversification. When a firm considers diversifying into or exiting to another industry, it will be partly guided by its current knowledge base. As Chang (1996, p. 590 ) notes: 'A firm cannot simply jump into an industry where it cannot use any of its current stock of knowledge. . . . the direction of search activities should be "guided" by the firm's current knowledge base'. He confirms this hypothesis by finding that firms tend to enter industries with a similar human resource profile as the one they are currently in, and exit industries with a human resource profile dissimilar to their main or current activities. 1 In this context, in a model of competition between firms, for instance, the zero-profit condition would no longer determine the number (and composition) of firms in the industry, given that the most efficient firms would exit the industry long before profits are driven down to zero. In fact, the transferability of inputs and skills between products is one of the advantages of the multiproduct firm (Levy & Haber, 1986) . Because of opportunism and uncertainty, such inputs are easier to transfer within than between firms.
Fixed costs are often used as a proxy for opportunity costs. It is true that fixed costs can represent difficult-to-measure opportunity costs. However, this asserted equivalence between fixed costs and opportunity costs has kept a major difference between them in the shadow: that economics cannot tell us much in general about (technologically determined) fixed costs, but should be able to tell us more about opportunity costs. The aim of this paper is to put a structure on these opportunity costs, by relating them to efficiency.
The idea that reservation profits are related to efficiency can alter standard economic analysis in many ways. In this paper, I examine the effect of this relationship on the entry and exit of firms. When very efficient firms have high reservation profits (because skills are highly interchangeable between industries), does increased competition necessarily lead to the survival of the fittest? Facing an intensification of competition, low cost firms may prefer to exit the market and move to other activities where competition is less intense. It remains true that competition ultimately drives profits (net of opportunity costs) to zero, but it does not automatically result in the survival of the fittest.
Equivalently, the problem can be seen as one of intense competition acting as a deterrent for entry by efficient firms. A competent entrepreneur with highly innovative skills (and therefore with high opportunity costs, because he/she can be successful in many industries) considering entering one of a number of industries, will prefer a less competitive industry to a more competitive one. Hence, competition does not necessarily attract the best players; actually it may attract the worse, those who have low opportunity costs because they are inefficient.
This problem is studied in a Cournot setting, with incumbents and a potential entrant. The potential entrant decides whether to enter or not; then, based on its decision, each incumbent decides whether to stay in the market or to exit, taking into account its post-entry profits and its reservation profits. In the last stage, all active firms compete à la Cournot. The main question is: when do efficient firms crowd out inefficient ones, and when does the opposite occur? Contrarily to what would happen if all firms had equal reservation profits, the inefficient firms will not necessarily be the first to exit. Asymmetric opportunity costs affect not only the size, but also the composition of the industry.
It is found that entry by a firm may result in the exit of a more or a less efficient firm, depending on the relationship between current profits and opportunity costs. When opportunity costs are highly correlated with current profits, inefficient firms will crowd out more efficient ones, since the efficient firms, who have high current profits and hence high opportunity costs, gain more by leaving the market following entry by an inefficient firm. Moreover, the latter will prefer to enter, given that its opportunity costs of entering are low (because of the high correlation between profits in that industry and opportunity costs). The opposite occurs when the correlation between current profits and opportunity costs is weak: efficient firms will crowd out inefficient ones.
The second dimension of opportunity costs, which affects firm selection, is the fixed cost of changing markets. When this fixed cost is high, inefficient firms tend to crowd out the more efficient firms. In that case, the profits high-cost firms would make in other markets are not sufficient to compensate for the cost of exiting the current market and entering an alternative market. At the same time, the low cost firm, because of transferable skills, can achieve high profits in the other market, and hence is more willing to exit the current market when competition intensifies. The opposite occurs when the fixed cost of changing markets is low: efficient firms tend to crowd out inefficient ones.
There exists a large literature on firm selection, studying which firms survive a decline in demand. Many of those studies predict that competition does not necessarily select the best firms or the best plants. Fudenberg & Tirole (1986) study selection in a setting of incomplete information about the rival's cost, and find that with symmetric expectations the less efficient firm exits. In a model of industry life-cycle, Londregan (1990) finds that with the possibility of re-entry and with positive reentry costs, small firms Opportunity Costs, Competition, and Firm Selection 411 stay in the market while larger firms exit. Garella & Richelle (1999) study the problem of firm selection in an infinite horizon supergame. They find that the exiting firms are those with higher average cost functions whenever re-entry is costless while, whenever re-entry is unprofitable, the exiting firms are those with lower marginal cost functions. Fine & Li (1989) and Huang & Li (1986) show that when demand declines probabilistically, there are equilibria where smaller firms stay in the market longer than larger firms. Dierickx et al. (1991) find that the order of exit of firms depends on the way in which demand shrinks (population shrinkage, decline in willingness to pay, parallel inward shift). Lippman et al. (1991) demonstrate that demand uncertainty can produce heterogeneity in the equilibrium employment of production technologies and can permit the coexistence of producers exhibiting different minimum average costs. Gromb et al. (1997) derive sufficient conditions for competition to select the most efficient firm in a dynamic entry deterrence framework. Esteve-Pérez (2005) studies the impact of vertical product differentiation on firm selection with declining demand, and finds that, in equilibrium, either the low quality or the high quality firm may elect to exit, depending on the ratios of fixed costs and outputs.
Some studies have focused on the capacity of firms as an instrument of firm selection. Ghemawat & Nalebuff (1985) find that in a duopolistic declining industry where the capacity choice is all or nothing, the largest firms exit first. The result extends to continuous capacity adjustment (Ghemawat & Nalebuff, 1990 ) because the larger firm has greater incentives to reduce its capacity, given that it benefits more from increasing prices. Whinston (1988) extends the framework of Ghemawat & Nalebuff to the case where firms have multiplant operations, and does not find support for their empirical predictions that with single plants duopolists, the larger duopolist exits first when facing a declining industry. Reynolds (1988) finds that the larger firm begins closing its plants before the smaller firm when the cost differences are not too large. Ruiz-Aliseda (2003) analyzes the incentives of two firms differentiated by their opportunity costs to enter and exit a market which first expands and then declines. While the high opportunity cost firm may have an incentive to exit first if both firms are active, it may also have an incentive to enter before the low opportunity cost firm, potentially monopolizing the market. In contrast to the current paper, Ruiz-Aliseda does not model product market competition explicitly, and does not consider the relationship between current efficiency and opportunity costs.
Empirically, there is some evidence of industries where selection does not always conform to the predictions of the standard economic model. Ghemawat & Nalebuff (1990) report empirical evidence that in a number of industries, in the face of declining demand, larger firms have tended to reduce capacity more than smaller firms did (and more than proportionally to their market share). Ghemawat (1984) finds that, over the 1967-1977 period in 294 US manufacturing industries, declines in demand were associated with decreases in concentration, which is consistent with the idea that large firms suffer more from the intensification in competition than smaller firms. Lieberman (1990) , using data on 30 chemical products, finds that large multiplant firms are more likely to close individual plants. Zingales (1998) finds that due to capital market imperfections, deregulation in the trucking industry has led to the survival of relatively inefficient firms, which may be helped by their deep pockets. Abouzeedan & Busler (2003) study the performance of firms using the Survival Index Value, and find that firm size does not always increase the survivability of Swedish SMEs. This paper goes in the direction of showing that the transferability of skills also can result in the survival of inefficient firms, and, furthermore, in the crowding out of low cost firms by high cost ones. The model is presented in the next section and solved in the following section. Some applications are discussed in the fourth section. The fifth section concludes.
The Model
There are n . 1 firms producing a homogeneous output. Firms face a linear inverse demand
. . , ng and, without loss of generality, let the firm with the lowest marginal cost among incumbents be firm 1, and the firm with the highest marginal cost among incumbents be firm n. To simplify the exposition of the results, it is assumed that no two incumbents have the same costs: c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n . It is also assumed that the potential entrant's cost is equal to the cost of one of the incumbents. The costs of incumbents are such that each incumbent produces strictly positive output before entry, and that all remaining firms after entry, as well as the potential entrant (if entry occurs), produce strictly positive output.
Firms' reservation profits are related to their efficiency, with the most efficient firms having higher reservation profits. Ideally, one would want to link reservation profits directly to costs, withp 0 (c) , 0, wherep denotes reservation profits. However, without a firm theoretical basis as to how reservation profits are related to costs, it is difficult to say more about the function p(c). Given the difficulty of linking reservation profits directly to costs, we link them to current profits, and therefore indirectly to costs. Namely, we use a functionp(p ib ), where p ib is the profit of firm i before entry, such thatp 0 (p b ) . 0. Given that p b 0 (c) , 0 (this will become obvious later), the functionp(p b (c)) satisfies the basic property mentioned above. More specifically, we use the functional form
with a, F . 0 and parameters are such thatp i . 0 for all i. a represents the degree of interchangeability of skills between industries. The higher a, the more interchangeable skills are, and the higher is the correlation between reservation profits and current profits. F is a fixed term which represents the fixed cost of changing markets. a and F are common to all firms. This functional form represents a generalization of two functional forms, which are natural to study in the analysis of the relationship between Opportunity Costs, Competition, and Firm Selection 413 current profits and reservation profits. The first form isp i ¼ ap ib (with F ¼ 0) where reservation profits are a constant fraction of current profits. The second form isp i ¼ p ib À F (with a ¼ 1) where the difference between current profits and reservation profits is the same for all firms.
Once reservation profits are derived as above, they are treated as a constant: they do not change with changes in the market. Reservation profits depend on conditions prevailing in other markets, and these conditions are assumed to remain unchanged.
Note that, in this paper, the term 'lowest cost firm' or 'most efficient firm' refers to the firm with the lowest variable production cost; it does not mean that that firm has the lowest sum of production and opportunity costs. Furthermore, to emphasize the distinction made in this paper between fixed costs and opportunity costs, we refer to the latter as opportunity costs, not fixed costs.
The game has three stages. In the first stage, a potential entrant decides whether to enter or not, and executes its decision. In the second stage, after observing the behavior of the potential entrant, each incumbent considers whether it wants to stay in the market or to exit (due to the displacement effect), and executes its decision. In the last stage, active firms compete à la Cournot. Entry and exit decisions, as well as firms' costs, are common knowledge.
In order to compute reservation profits, we need first to calculate Cournot profits. In an industry composed of n firms, the profits of incumbent i (before entry) would be p ib ¼ (p(Y) 2 c i )y i , which, given profit-maximizing output choices yields:
It is assumed that the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are satisfied. The usefulness of equation (2) is that it yields the profits of firms before entry, which determine firms' reservation profits. The reservation profits of firm i arē
It will be sufficient for now to mention that p ib .p i for all i. This will be shown to hold in equilibrium. This is essential for the initial Cournot equilibrium to be stable, otherwise some firms may prefer to exit at the outset. In the first stage, a potential entrant considers whether to enter the market or not. If it enters, the entrant expects to realize profits p ea , which are the profits after entry (taking the presence of the incumbents as given):
If it does not enter, the potential entrant realizes its reservation profits. Given that the potential entrant is identical to one of the incumbents, it has the same reservation profits as that incumbent. Namely, if the incumbent that is identical to the potential entrant is firm i with cost c i ¼ c e and with reservation profitsp i ¼ ap ib À F, the reservation profits of the entrant will bep e ¼p i . The potential entrant will enter if the profits it expects to realize (assuming that no firm exits) are higher than its reservation profits, p ea !p e . Therefore, the entry decision will be contingent on a and F. 2 In the second stage, each incumbent considers whether it will stay in the market or not, after observing the decision of the potential entrant, and executes its decision. The profits of incumbent i if entry occurs are
p ia e represents the profits of incumbent i after entry of a firm with cost c e . This does not mean that firm e will actually enter. Rather, p ia e is computed to analyze the behavior of firm i if e enters, not to describe the post-entry equilibrium. 3 It is straightforward to verify that entry reduces incumbents' profits: p ia , p ib for all i.
If entry occurs, incumbent i will exit if p ia p i . It is possible to find parameters a and F such that any number of firms (from 0 to n) exits. As mentioned in the introduction, the focus of this paper is on the identity of the firms that exit, rather than on their number. In order to focus the analysis, we assume that a and F are such that there are as few firms as possible, but at least one, such that p ia ¼ p i . This is done through the choice of a and F. This allows us to relate reservation profits, represented by the couple (a,F), to the identity of the firm(s) that exit(s).
Note that this choice of a and F implies that only one firm will exit. For, if p a ¼ p for more than one firm, the exit of only one of those firms will cause the condition to become non-binding for the other firm(s): its exit will result in an increase in p a for the other firm(s), and they will now prefer to stay in the market.
Analysis

Impact of Entry on Firms' Profits
The incentives for exit relate to the relationship between current profits and reservation profits. Consider any two firms i and j, with c i , c j . Because p i . p j , firm i can suffer a larger reduction in profits before exiting, and hence firm j may have greater incentives to exit. However, because p i . p j , firm i may hit its reservation profits constraint first, and hence may have greater incentives to exit. Which firm will exit will depend on how profits are reduced through entry. The following lemma addresses this question.
Lemma 1 4
Let Dp i ; p ib 2 p ia . In a n-firm oligopoly competing à la Cournot and facing a linear demand, for any pairs of incumbents:
(a) Entry by a firm induces the largest reduction in the profits of the most efficient incumbent (i.e. Dp i . Dp j iff c i , c j ); (b) Entry by a firm induces the largest proportional reduction in the profits of the least efficient incumbent (i.e. Dp i /p ib , Dp j /p jb iff c i , c j ).
Exit Incentives
Given the relationships between profits/reservation profits of firms and their levels of efficiency, there are two effects that determine which firm will exit. First, because Dp i . Dp j (Lemma 1(a)), the absolute reduction in the profits of firm i is larger, hence it has greater incentives to exit. Second, because Dp i /p ib , Dp j /p jb (Lemma 1(b)), the proportional reduction in the profits of firm j is more important. Hence if reservation profits are a constant fraction of current profits for all firms, exit by the inefficient firm is more likely.
Note that by assuming that p ¼ 0 for all firms, the literature implicitly assumes that reservation profits of all firms are a constant fraction (0) of current profits, hence it is not surprising that inefficient firms are thought to exit first through competition, given that they suffer the largest proportional reduction in profits. Moreover, it is not equivalent to assume that p ¼ 0 or p ¼ k . 0 for all firms, as in the latter case reservation profits are not a constant fraction of current profits.
We now state the main result of the paper, which links the reservation profits function p to the entry and exit decisions.
Proposition 1
Let reservation profits be given by p i ¼ ap ib 2 F, with a . 0 and F . 0, and let a and F be such that there are as few firms as possible, but at least one, such that p ia ¼ p i . Let . 0 such that a ¼ a ij e iff F ¼ F ij e and such that a ij e1 , a ij e2 iff c e1 , c e2 , and which determine the pattern of entry and exit as follows (with i , j , k):
. when a jk e , a , a ij e the potential entrant enters and firm j exits; . when a ¼ a ij e the potential entrant enters and either firm i or firm j exits; . when c e ¼ c i , where i is the firm that would exit, no entry and therefore no exit occurs.
Proposition 1 states that when a and F are very high, entry tends to crowd out the most efficient firm. As a and F decline, it is the second most efficient firm that exits, and so on. When a and F are very low, entry tends to crowd out the highest cost firm. When the potential entrant is identical to the firm that would exit, no entry and no exit occur. There are critical levels of a and F which determine which firm will exit. However, when a and F take exactly those critical values, the model predicts that one of two specific firms will exit, but cannot determine which of those two firms will. 5 The higher is the cost of the entrant, the higher is the critical value of a that is necessary to induce the exit of a specific firm.
Remember that a firm with a higher cost has a lower post-entry profit than a firm with a lower cost. Also, note that a affects the absolute difference between firms' reservation profits, but not the proportional difference between them. When a is low, the relation between current profits and reservation profits is weak, and reservation profits do not differ much between firms. Since high cost firms are making lower profits following entry, for the condition p a ¼ p to be satisfied for as few firms as possible, it will be satisfied for high cost firms only. In consequence, the firm with the highest cost exits. As a increases, the reservation profits of a low cost firm are increased more than the reservation profits of a high cost firm (because p b is higher for low cost firms). The condition p a ¼ p is now satisfied for the firm with the second highest cost, and so on. Hence, when a takes intermediate values, it induces the exit of firms with intermediate costs. As a becomes very large, the reservation profits of low cost firms are significantly higher than the reservation profits of high cost firms, therefore the lowest cost firm exits.
Consider now the effect of F, the fixed cost of changing markets. 6 F affects the proportional difference between firms' reservation profits, but does not affect the absolute difference between them. Moreover,
5 Vettas (2000) studies the coordination of entry and exit through mixed strategies. 6 Remember from Lemma 1(b) that entry induces a larger proportional reduction in the profits of high cost firms.
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Hence, when F is nil, reservation profits are a constant proportion of p b for all firms. When F is low, the proportional differences in the ratio p /p b are not too important between firms, therefore firms facing the highest proportional reduction in profits tend to exit first. When F is high, reservation profits represent an even higher proportion of p b for low cost firms (because p b is higher for low cost firms). In that case, even though low cost firms face a lower proportional reduction in profits, the very high ratio p /p b for them implies that they exit first. In consequence, the likelihood that inefficient firms crowd out efficient ones is greater when the fixed (independent of current profits) loss in profits due to leaving the market is larger.
When the cost of changing markets is high, the profits high-cost firms would make on other markets are not sufficient to compensate for the cost of exiting the current market and entering an alternative market. At the same time, the low-cost firm, because of transferable skills, can achieve high profits on the other market, and hence is more willing to exit the current market when competition intensifies. Whereas, when the cost of changing markets is low, the reduction in the profits of high cost firms induces them to leave the market; even though their alternative profits are low, they can afford to switch due to the low costs of changing markets. Efficient firms prefer to stay, i.e. they would not choose to exit before high cost firms have done so.
We see that the effects of a and F go in the same direction: a high a and a high F induce the exit of more efficient firms, while a low a and a low F induce the exit of less efficient firms. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of a and F with n ¼ 3. The figure plots the locus of combinations of a and F such that p ¼ p a for as few firms as possible, but at least one. This translates into the exit of exactly one firm (except when the potential entrant is identical to the firm that would exit, in which case no exit occurs). When a . a 12 and F . F 12 , firm 1 exits. When a ¼ a 12 and F ¼ F 12 , either firm 1 or firm 2 exits. When a [ (a 12 , a 12 ) and F [ (F 12 , F 12 ), firm 2 exits. When a ¼ a 23 and F ¼ F 23 , either firm 2 or firm 3 exits. Finally, when a , a 23 and F , F 23 , firm 3 exits. Along this schedule, exactly one firm exits; to the right (left) of the schedule more firms (respectively, no firm) exit.
To see how accounting for asymmetries in reservation profits affects firm selection, consider what would happen if all firms had p ¼ k. In such a situation if entry is to induce the exit of some firm(s), it will be the least efficient firms that will exit first. We saw that when firms have different reservation profits, this does not necessarily occur. Moreover, the explicit modeling of reservation profits allows us to predict how they determine the pattern of exit.
Proposition 1 states that a ij e1 , a ij e2 : the critical a is higher when the entrant has a higher cost. 7 We know that a low cost entrant reduces the profits of incumbents by a larger amount than a high cost entrant. Therefore, to induce the exit of a given firm, reservation profits have to be higher when 7 The locus drawn in Figure 1 was drawn for a given type of potential entrant. For a different potential entrant, a different locus would obtain.
418 Gamal Atallah facing a higher cost entrant. For instance, the likelihood that a low cost firm is crowded out is greater if the entrant is an intermediate cost firm than if the entrant is a high cost firm. This can have the paradoxical effect that the benefits of increased competition are larger when this increased competition comes from high-cost firms than from intermediate-cost firms. 8 Nonetheless, a complete welfare analysis would take into account the impact of efficiency in the other industry (to which a firm exits) on total welfare. Consider now the last part of Proposition 1, which states that when c e ¼ c i , where i is the firm that would exit, no entry (and henceforth no exit) occurs. Remember that there is exactly one incumbent which is identical to the potential entrant. If the firm that decides to exit is different from that incumbent, then the firm that is identical to the potential entrant has decided to stay, which implies that entry is profitable to the potential entrant. If, however, the firm that would exit if the potential entrant entered is identical to that entrant, then this would mean that entry is not profitable to the potential entrant, implying that no entry and no exit occur.
We now see the usefulness of the assumption that no two incumbents are identical. From the definition of a ij , it is clear that it would not be defined if c i ¼ c j . In this case we would have to define the as for adjacent non-identical firms, which would complicate the presentation of the results without providing any additional insights.
The assumption that only one firm exits is less restrictive than it seems. Even if more than one firm were to exit, firms with costs close to the firm predicted to exit by the model would have greater incentives to exit. Figure 1 . Critical values of a and F (n ¼ 3) 8 In the standard model with zero opportunity costs, the opposite would obtain; high cost firms could reduce welfare even without inducing exit; see Khan & Yuan (1999) .
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Efficient and inefficient firms leave the market for different reasons. When a and F are low, inefficient firms leave first because their profits are low, and the decline in their profits is greatest. When, on the other hand, a and F are high, efficient firms leave first, not because their profits are low, but because their opportunity costs are high.
It is often said that modern technologies are more easily transferable from one activity to the other. The model predicts that this should translate into the exit of low-cost firms more often in the face of intensifying competition. Moreover, opportunity costs are likely to differ considerably from one industry to the other, implying that similar entry threats can have different effects between industries.
Entry and Efficiency
Proposition 1 characterized the general result linking the type of potential entrant to the type of exiting firm (if any). In many cases we care most about whether entry increases the average efficiency in the industry, i.e. whether the entering firm is replacing a more or less efficient firm. While this result is already incorporated into Proposition 1, it is stated more clearly in the following corollary.
Corollary 1
A potential entrant of type j:
. crowds out a more efficient firm if a . a ij and F . F ij ;
. crowds out a less efficient firm if a , a jk and F , F jk .
The interpretation is similar to the discussion following Proposition 1. However, the corollary emphasizes an important result: even when an entrant crowds out a more efficient firm, it is not necessarily the most efficient firm among the incumbents that is crowded out. Similarly, when an entrant crowds out a less efficient firm, it is not necessarily the least efficient firm that exits. That is, the model does not say that high opportunity costs lead to the exit of the best, while low opportunity costs lead to the exit of the worse. Rather, any firm in the market can exit following entry, depending on the intensity of the relationship between current efficient and opportunity costs, and on the fixed costs of changing markets.
When the relationship between reservation profits and efficiency is strong and the fixed costs of changing markets are high, either high cost firms crowd out efficient firms, or no entry occurs (the no entry case obtains when the potential entrant is a low cost firm). On the other hand, when the relation between reservation profits and efficiency is weak and the fixed costs of changing markets are low, either low cost firms replace high cost firms, or no entry occurs (the no entry case obtains when the potential entrant is a high cost firm).
The model indicates circumstances under which an intensification in competition can lead to the replacement of a low cost firm by a high cost one. When the market is sufficiently large, firms' fixed costs have no impact on the prevailing price. Therefore, the exit of an efficient firm following the entry of a less efficient one will result in an increase in prices and a decrease in welfare. The optimal level of competition is probably lower when skills are transferable than when all firms have equal reservation profits, especially when potential competition is represented by high cost firms.
While, a priori, any firm may exit following entry, the model indicates a tendency for the lowest cost firm and the highest cost firm to exit more often than intermediate firms. This is because the intervals [a n21,n , a 1,2 ] and [F n21,n , F 1,2 ] are very small. When a and F lie in those intervals, intermediate firms will exit. However, when a and F lie outside those intervals, the lowest cost firm or the highest cost firm will exit. To see this more clearly, consider the following two numerical parameterizations of the model. In both cases let A ¼ 1000 and c i ¼ i. In the first case let n ¼ 3 and c e ¼ 2, and in the second case let n ¼ 10 and c e ¼ 5. Table 1 presents the intervals [a n21,n , a 1,2 ] and [F n21,n , F 1,2 ] in both cases. We see that the intervals are very small, implying that for most admissible values of a and F, it will be the lowest cost firm (when a and F are high) or the highest cost firm (when a and F are low) that will exit. When the entry of any type of firm induces more often the exit of 'extreme' firms, in the long run highly competitive industries will be populated mostly by intermediate cost firms. 9
Applications
This research complements a number of modeling efforts 10 which have aimed at identifying circumstances under which competition may not result in the survival of the fittest. The paper shows that the transferability of skills can also affect firm selection. These models help explain the existing empirical evidence indicating that in many industries the more efficient or the larger firms have suffered more from competition, or have closed more plants, than smaller firms.
A nice empirical illustration of the model studied in this paper is provided by Sembenelli & Vannoni (2000) , who analyze entry and exit at the firm level Table 1 . Numerical examples of critical a and F n ¼ 3 a 2,3 ¼ 0.799598 a 1,2 ¼ 0.800400 F 2,3 ¼ 9935 F 1,2 ¼ 9985 n ¼ 10 a 9,10 ¼ 0.902828 a 1,2 ¼ 0.910984 F 9,10 ¼ 669 F 1,2 ¼ 737 9
Interestingly, Gutierrez & Pombo (2004) , using data on plant turnover and productivity in Colombia's petrochemical industry over the period 1974-1998, find that entry is mostly composed of small and medium size plants, and that medium size plants have the highest survival rate. 10 Some of which are discussed in detail in the introduction.
Opportunity Costs, Competition, and Firm Selection 421 using data on the 100 largest industrial groups in Italy for the years 1987 and 1993. The focus is on diversified entry, where the entrants are firms already established in other industries. They note that, even in the presence of entry barriers to newcomers, 'product differentiation advantages based on brand preferences, established reputation or legal patents [can] generate externalities that can be exploited in adjacent industries [by diversified firms]' (Sembenelli & Vannoni, 2000, p. 443) . They find that firms tend to diversify into industries that share similar characteristics with their current operations, for example, having similar patterns of vertical relationships, and similar intensities of advertising and R&D. This increases the transferability of skills and competencies between the current and new activities. More importantly for the current paper, they find that 'large and more profitable firms show a higher propensity or ability to enter new industries' (Sembenelli & Vannoni, 2000, p. 449) . Moreover, 'large and more profitable firms show a higher propensity or ability to exit' (Sembenelli & Vannoni, 2000, p. 451) .
The authors attribute this result to either higher managerial ability for those firms, which allows them to better exploit short-run disequilibria, entering industries in expansion and exiting industries in decline, or to a 'core business strategies' argument, in response to the approaching single market. In terms of our model, more profitable firms have both lower variable cost and higher opportunity costs; this makes them more likely to exit to exploit those other 'opportunities' when conditions become less favorable in the current market. Hence, the diversified entry of Italian firms studied by Sembenelli & Vannoni (2000) reflects a case where a is high, which makes profitable firms more likely to exit. Haynes et al. (2003) also find a positive relationship between firm size and divestment in the UK. From that perspective, the model can also be used to analyze the location choices of MNEs. Given the relatively high mobility of MNEs, it can be assumed that they enjoy a high degree of transferability of skills: they can shift easily from one market to another. The model predicts not only that MNEs will choose low competition markets over high competition ones (as would any standard model of entry and exit), but that the best MNEs will enter (or not exit) the least competitive markets, while the worst MNEs will enter the most competitive ones. The same logic can be applied to multiproduct firms. Baden-Fuller (1989) and Lieberman (1990) find that diversified firms were more likely to close plants when industries declined.
a can also be seen as a measure of asset specialization. The lower a, the less transferable skills are, the more specialized the assets to the current industry are, and the weaker is the relation between current efficiency and reservation profits. Insofar as asset specialization can be a choice variable, a can be affected by the technological choice of the firm (e.g. the level of flexibility of the technology). In this case a can differ between firms. It could be that when the firm chooses a lower c, it has to opt for a lower a: a more dedicated asset is more efficient, but less transferable to other activities. There is a similarity between the decisions firms face regarding the choice of flexibility of a technology (high fixed costs and low variable costs, or vice versa; flexibility can also be seen as the speed with which costs increase as we move away from the minimum efficient scale) and the transferability of skills (low c and low a, or vice versa). Both flexibility of the technology and transferability of skills can be seen as strategic variables.
Typically, studies on firm survival do not use opportunity costs, given that these are difficult to observe. An exception is Gort et al. (2002) , who study plant survival using data on about 100,000 US plants over the period 1967-1997 . They make the hypothesis that plants with a high mobility of inputs (represented by a low ratio of fixed capital to other inputs) translate into higher opportunity costs of the inputs, and a lower probability of survival of the plant. This leads them to hypothesize also that plants of multiunit firms have a lower probability of survival, since the resources of these plants can be more easily redeployed within the firm. Both hypotheses are confirmed by the data, although the relationship becomes weaker over time. This study provides an example where survival can be directly linked to opportunity costs, and where elements with the highest opportunity cost are the first to exit in the aggregate. 11 This is clearly a case which is possible in the context of our model.
In general, the division of labor entails a low transferability of skills 12 (or a high degree of specialization) between activities. While it is true that for a firm in a given sector, most other economic activities are deemed irrelevant as alternatives to their current operations, 13 there are obvious cases where skills in one industry may be useful in another industry. The current profits of a firm in industry A may be positively correlated with its profits from moving to industry B, but negatively correlated with its profits from moving to industry C. Hence, the model does not really go counter to the thesis of specialization and the division of labor. Rather, it takes into account technological similarities between market-unrelated industries.
The theory can also be applied to individuals. The degree of transferability of skills diminishes as life progresses. Hence, we can expect opportunity costs to have their fullest effect early in the individual's life: the most able students are unlikely to choose sectors where the supply of labor is abundant (even if they require high skills, e.g. high school teachers), and hence pay is limited. Rather, they will choose fields of study where there is less competition between workers. Competition selects the fittest among those who have chosen a given field. But fields where competition is high will not have attracted the best candidates in the first place. Whether similar life-cycle considerations apply to firms is an open question, but the entrepreneur, at least early in her career, certainly specializes over time in the field in which she operates, and is likely to choose where to operate based on similar considerations.
In a different setting, Lewis & Sappington (1991) study the make-or-buy decision of a firm facing a subcontractor with transferable skills: his opportunity costs decline with his production cost. They find that in this case the firm buys from the subcontractor only if his production costs are sufficiently high, because his information rent decreases with his production costs. This is reminiscent of a situation where only inefficient subcontractors remain in the industry. This result has a flavor similar to the results of the current paper.
The proposed research program has theoretical, empirical, as well as policy ramifications. Theoretically, the work would go against the conventional wisdom that competition always leads to the survival of the fittest, and would induce a deeper reflection on the relation between reservation utility and efficiency.
From an empirical point of view, the paper sheds light on the empirical evidence discussed in the introduction showing that in some cases the best firms are not always those surviving competition. Moreover, by showing that competition can discourage very efficient firms from entering the market, the actual efficiency loss may be greater than what is measurable empirically. More generally, the empirical test of the model is how the firm's efficiency is related to the intensity of competition in the markets where it enters/exits, and how this relationship is affected by the transferability of skills.
The model focuses on the exit behavior of firms and on the cost to an industry of losing an efficient incumbent. But the same analysis applies to potential entrants. When an efficient incumbent finds it profitable to leave the market, this means that an (identical) efficient potential entrant will not find it profitable to enter the market. Hence, the cost can be expressed in terms of exit of an efficient incumbent, or in terms of the non-entry of an efficient potential entrant.
Lastly, policymakers would be interested in determining circumstances under which increased competition can decrease the overall efficiency of the industry. The allowed concentration levels could be made contingent on the degree of transferability of skills. Welfare analysis becomes more complex, however, since the efficient firm exits one industry to enter another. Nonetheless, when an efficient firm exits an industry in country A (because of stiff competition) and enters an industry in country B (where competition is softer), welfare in country A is unambiguously reduced.
When intense competition has prevailed in an industry for a long time, the best firms will have left that industry a long time ago, and the industry will be in a stationary state equilibrium with agents with intermediate or low levels of efficiency. The loss to that industry is invisible, because the best agents do not bother entering. In the presence of transferable skills, perfect competition may not always constitute the ideal benchmark of market structure.
This points to an important difference between this model and the models studying the effects of declining industries on selection: those models focus on oligopolistic industries, while the present model may apply to different market structures. The problem of inefficient selection may be found in 424 Gamal Atallah concentrated as well as in highly competitive industries. Firms need not be multi-product or multi-plant, nor behave strategically, for inefficient selection to occur.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to analyze the effect of the dependence of opportunity costs on current efficiency on the pattern of firm selection. It is well known that skills and competencies can be transferred to other industries when they have the characteristics of public goods within the firm, or at least are sharable between activities (Levy & Haber, 1986) . This is reminiscent of Penrose's (1959) view of the firm, where some assets become idle during the growth of the firm and can be redeployed in new operations. The model developed here studies the effect of the degree of skill transferability on firm entry and exit.
In contrast with 'technological' fixed costs, which are often used as a proxy for opportunity costs, the explicit modeling of opportunity costs allows us to draw an economic relationship between them and current efficiency. It was shown that entry by a firm may result in the exit of a more or a less efficient firm, depending on the relationship between current profits and opportunity costs. The paper does not say that competition induces the exit of the fittest. Rather, it shows how any type of firm may exit following an intensification of competition, depending on the relationship between opportunity costs and efficiency, and on the type of entrant. Moreover, it identifies two important characteristics of the relationship, namely the strength of the correlation between current profits and opportunity costs, and the fixed cost of changing markets.
The results obtained here are consistent with a body of empirical evidence indicating that competition does not always lead to the survival of the fittest (see the Introduction and the previous section). Furthermore, the results are also consistent with another body of empirical evidence pertaining to the relationship between entry and exit. The positive correlation between entry and exit rates is widely documented in different countries (Cable & Schwalbach, 1991) and in different industries (Caves, 1998; Geroski, 1995) . This is consistent with the approach of the current paper, where entry and exit are strongly interrelated, rather than being due to different factors, or occurring independently of one another. Moreover, quasisimultaneous entry and exit suggest that the entering and exiting firms have different characteristics, which is again consistent with the present model, where the entering and exiting firms are always of different sizes.
The analysis was performed in a partial equilibrium framework. The application of the model in a general equilibrium framework has been briefly discussed in the previous section, with respect to technological similarities between industries, career choice by individuals, and welfare analysis when firms enter or exit different countries. But a full-fledged general equilibrium (with two sectors, for example) model would allow the opening-up of the black-box of opportunity costs by making explicit the opportunity costs Opportunity Costs, Competition, and Firm Selection 425 that are represented by the profit level that would be obtained in the other sector. As long as there is a positive correlation between firms' efficiencies in both sectors, one would expect the qualitative results of the model to continue to hold in a general equilibrium framework.
This modeling awaits further developments. The analysis was performed in a Cournot setting; it would be interesting to see how asymmetric reservation profits interact with Bertrand competition. There is clearly a need for a better understanding of how reservation profits are related to current efficiency; in this paper an indirect link was established between the two through current profits, but a direct link between current costs and reservation profits would produce a more general model, especially if dynamics are to be incorporated. In this model the intensification of competition took the form of entry; however, the analysis is easily extendable to intensified competition due to any other factor, such as declining demand. Finally, the differences between technological fixed costs and opportunity costs need to be studied further. For instance, uncertainty about technological fixed costs is resolved after production, whereas uncertainty about reservation profits can be resolved only when the firm leaves the market.
